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Secure Key Distribution by Swapping Quantum Entanglement
Daegene Song
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive, MS 8910, Gaithersburg, MD 20899
We report two key distribution schemes achieved by swapping quantum entanglement. Using two
Bell states, two bits of secret key can be shared between two distant parties that play symmetric
and equal roles. We also address eavesdropping attacks against the schemes.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
Cryptography has been one of the most fruitful appli-
cations coming out of quantum information theory and
it appears to be practically implementible in the near-
est future among quantum technology [1]. Since the first
key distribution protocol using four quantum states was
proposed in 1984 (called BB84) [2], a number of crypto-
graphic methods based on quantum mechanics have been
proposed [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. At
the heart of quantum technology, including that of cryp-
tography, lies entanglement. Quantum entanglement is a
subtle nonlocal correlation between the parts of a quan-
tum system and has no classical analog. In 1991, Ekert
showed [3] that quantum entanglement can be useful in
sharing private keys between the two parties. Suppose
Alice and Bob share many maximally entangled pairs
of qubits. They then make measurements in jointly de-
termined random bases. After the measurements, Al-
ice and Bob publicly announce which basis they have
used. If they had measured in the same basis, the keys
would be perfectly correlated. Instead of discarding the
keys resulting from measuring in different bases, Alice
and Bob use them to check whether or not Bell’s in-
equality is satisfied. If it is, then Eve’s presence is de-
tected. If not, Eve is absent and they keep the perfectly
correlated keys. Entanglement swapping [16] (also see
[17, 18]) is a method that enables one to entangle two
quantum systems that do not have direct interaction with
one another. Based on entanglement swapping, quantum
key distribution (QKD) protocols have been introduced
[8, 13, 15] as well as the ones without alternative mea-
surements [5, 8, 9, 12, 13] as seen in BB84 and Ekert’s
protocols.
In this paper, we report two QKD schemes using en-
tanglement swapping which also do not require alterna-
tive measurements, thereby improving the rate of gen-
erated key bits per transmitted qubit, i.e. two bits per
two Bell states. This rate of generated key bits is an
improvement from the protocols introduced in [8, 13].
In order to illustrate entanglement swapping, we first
define four Bell states as Φ± ≡ (|00〉 ± |11〉)/√2 and
Ψ± ≡ (|01〉 ± |10〉)/√2. Suppose two distant parties, Al-
ice and Bob, share Φ+12 and Φ
+
34 where Alice has qubits 1
and 4, and Bob possesses 2 and 3. A measurement is per-
formed on qubits 2 and 3 with the Bell basis, Φ± and Ψ±,
then the total state is projected onto |η1〉 = Φ+23 ⊗ Φ+14,
|η2〉 = Φ−23⊗Φ−14, |η3〉 = Ψ+23⊗Ψ+14, and |η4〉 = Ψ−23⊗Ψ−14
with equal probability of 1/4 for each. Previous entan-
glement between qubits 1 and 2, and 3 and 4 are now
swapped into entanglement between qubits 2 and 3, and
1 and 4. Although we considered entanglement swap-
ping with the initial state Φ+12 ⊗ Φ+34, similar results can
be achieved with other Bell states. For example, when
Alice and Bob initially share Φ−12 and Ψ
+
34, there are four
possible measurement outcomes with equal probability.
If Bob gets Φ+ when qubits 2 and 3 are measured, then
Alice will obtain Ψ− for qubits 1 and 4. We denote this
possibility as {Ψ−14,Φ+23}. There are three other possi-
bilities, {Φ+14,Ψ−23}, {Φ−14,Ψ+23} and {Ψ+14,Φ−23}. Table I
shows Bell measurement outcomes for initial states of a
different combination of four Bell states.
In order to illustrate QKD based on entanglement
swapping, we assign two bits to the measurement re-
sults as shown in table II. This assignment of two bits
has a stipulation that one has to know both Alice and
Bob’s results in order to know the key bits. For in-
stance, even if Eve knows Φ+14 without knowing Bob’s
result, there are still four different possible keys. We
also introduce another basis, i.e. a rotated basis, ω± ≡
(|0+〉 ± |1−〉)/√2 and χ± ≡ (|0−〉 ± |1+〉)/√2 where
|+〉 ≡
√
1/4|0〉+
√
3/4|1〉 and |−〉 ≡
√
3/4|0〉−
√
1/4|1〉.
The first proposed QKD protocol, which we will call
Scheme I, goes as follows (see Fig. 1):
(S1) Alice prepares qubits 1 and 2 either in Bell basis,
i.e. chosen from Ψ±12, Φ
±
12, or on a rotated basis,
ω±12, χ
±
12, known only to herself.
(S2) Bob also prepares qubits 3 and 4 either in Bell ba-
sis chosen from Ψ±34,Φ
±
34, or on a rotated basis of
ω±34, χ
±
34 , known only to himself.
(S3) Alice sends qubit 2 to Bob and Bob transmits qubit
4 to Alice through public channels.
(S4) Alice and Bob each publicly confirm that the other
received the qubits.
(S5) Alice and Bob also announce which basis have been
used (i.e. either Bell basis or a rotated basis).
(S6) If the received qubit had been prepared in the ro-
tated basis, Alice (or Bob) rotates back the re-
ceived qubit into Bell basis by applying UR =√
1/4|0〉〈0|+√3/4|0〉〈1|+√3/4|1〉〈0|−√1/4|1〉〈1|.
2Φ+34 Φ
−
34 Ψ
+
34 Ψ
−
34
Φ+12 Id +− ΦΨ both
Φ−12 +− Id both ΦΨ
Ψ+12 ΦΨ both Id +−
Ψ−12 both ΦΨ +− Id
TABLE I: Alice (on qubits 1 and 4) and Bob’s (on qubits
2 and 3) Bell measurement results for Bell states 1 and 2,
and 3 and 4. The symbol, “Id”means there are four possible
outcomes for Alice and Bob’s Bell measurement, {Φ+14,Φ
+
23},
{Φ−14,Φ
−
23}, {Ψ
+
14,Ψ
+
23} and {Ψ
−
14,Ψ
−
23} with equal probability
of 1/4. Similarly, “+−”⇒ {Φ+14,Φ
−
23}, {Φ
−
14,Φ
+
23}, {Ψ
+
14,Ψ
−
23},
{Ψ−14,Ψ
+
23}, and “ΦΨ”⇒ {Φ
+
14,Ψ
+
23}, {Φ
−
14,Ψ
−
23}, {Ψ
+
14,Φ
+
23},
{Ψ−14,Φ
−
23}, and “both”⇒ {Φ
+
14,Ψ
−
23}, {Φ
−
14,Ψ
+
23}, {Ψ
+
14,Φ
−
23},
{Ψ−14,Φ
+
23}.
Id +− ΦΨ both
“00” {Φ+14,Φ
+
23} {Ψ
−
14,Ψ
+
23} {Φ
−
14,Ψ
−
23} {Ψ
+
14,Φ
−
23}
“01” {Ψ−14,Ψ
−
23} {Φ
+
14,Φ
−
23} {Ψ
+
14,Φ
+
23} {Φ
−
14,Ψ
+
23}
“10” {Ψ+14,Ψ
+
23} {Φ
−
14,Φ
+
23} {Ψ
−
14,Φ
−
23} {Φ
+
14,Ψ
−
23}
“11” {Φ−14,Φ
−
23} {Ψ
+
14,Ψ
−
23} {Φ
+
14,Ψ
+
23} {Ψ
−
14,Φ
+
23}
TABLE II: Assignment of key bits for Alice and Bob’s mea-
surement results for Scheme I . In order to discover key bits,
one has to know both Alice and Bob’s measurement results.
For Scheme II , we assign two bits to the initial Bell state
preparation, thereby the subscripts 14 and 23 are replaced by
12 and 34, respectively, in the table.
(S7) Alice and Bob perform Bell measurements on 1 and
4, and 2 and 3, respectively.
(S8) Alice and Bob announce which initial Bell states (If
the initial state were prepared on a rotated basis,
then it would correspond to one of four Bell states
after rotating it back, using the same local unitary
operation UR in (S6)) each had prepared.
(S9) Now knowing the initial Bell states prepared by
each other and their own measurement result, they
could determine which Bell measurement result the
other had obtained.
(S10) Finally, with the given Bell measurement result,
Alice and Bob share two key bits according to table
II.
For example, suppose Alice initially prepared Ψ+12 (or
χ+12) while Bob prepared Φ
−
34 (or ω
−
34). After they publicly
announce their prepared states as in (S8), from table I,
they could find out that there are four possible Bell mea-
surement outcomes: {Φ+14,Ψ−23}, {Φ−14,Ψ+23}, {Ψ+14,Φ−23},
and {Ψ−14,Φ+23}. Therefore, Alice and Bob, knowing their
own measurement results, could determine which corre-
lated measurement result both are sharing. If Alice got
Φ−14 and Bob obtained Ψ
+
23, then they will share the key
bits “01”according to table II.
In order to describe the second QKD scheme, we will
assign two bits to the initial state preparations. Just as
we assigned two bits to Alice and Bob’s measurement
results, we will assign the same two bits where initial
state for qubits 1 and 2 replacing Alice’s measurement
result and initial Bell state of qubits 3 and 4 replacing
Bob’s measurement result in table II. As in Scheme I,
the key bits for ω± (χ±) will be same as Φ± (Ψ±). The
second protocol is very similar to the first one, and it
proceeds the same as the first one until (S7) of Scheme I.
Then it goes as follows:
(S8′) Alice and Bob announce the result of their mea-
surements.
(S9′) Now each knowing the measurement results for
both and their own prepared state, Alice and Bob
could determine the initial state preparation by
each other from table III.
(S10′) This enables Alice and Bob to share two key bits
according to table II.
For example, if Alice’s measurement result is Φ−14 and
Bob obtains Ψ−23, then from table III, there are four possi-
ble state preparation: {Φ+12,Ψ+34},{Φ−12,Ψ−34}, {Ψ+12,Φ+34},
and {Ψ−12,Φ−34}. If Alice initially prepared Ψ+12 and Bob
prepared Φ+34 then they will share the key bits “01”ac-
cording to table II.
Although in the QKD schemes described above assert
that Alice and Bob publicly confirm whether the other re-
ceived the qubits and announce initial state preparation
or measurement result, in practice, this communication
will be through a private channel. In order to prevent
Eve from listening and altering these classical messages,
encrypted messages can be used. Note that two pro-
posed QKD schemes assume equal roles played by Alice
and Bob.
As in BB84, Alice and Bob can detect eavesdropping
by comparing the shared information publicly. They will
take out a sample and compare by publicly announcing
both the correlated measurement results and the initial
states. Comparing measurement result and initial states
rather than key bits gives extra safety since there are four
different possible measurement results (or initial prepa-
rations for Scheme II) for each key. Let us consider an
eavesdropping scenario for Scheme I as shown in Fig. 2.
Eve prepares Φ+56 while Alice and Bob, as before, prepare
initial states. Alice sends her qubit 2, and Eve intercepts
it and sends qubit 6 to Bob instead. Suppose Alice and
Bob use only the Bell basis rather than using both Bell
and the rotated basis. Eve could perform Bell measure-
ment on qubits 5 and 4 and perform local unitary oper-
ation, 1 for Φ+54, σz for Φ
−
54, σx for Ψ
+
54, and σxσz for
Ψ−54, on qubit 2 and return it to Alice. After Alice and
Bob announce initial preparation, Eve could find out the
key bits Alice and Bob are sharing. However, this would
not be possible since Alice and Bob prepared their initial
states in both Bell and the rotated bases and announced
the choice of basis after they confirmed the other received
the qubit. Therefore, it is important for Alice and Bob
not to reveal which state had been prepared initially and
3Measurement results States prepared
Id Φ+12Φ
+
34,Φ
−
12Φ
−
34,Ψ
+
12Ψ
+
34,Ψ
−
12Ψ
−
34
+− Φ+12Φ
−
34,Φ
−
12Φ
+
34,Ψ
+
12Ψ
−
34,Ψ
−
12Ψ
+
34
ΦΨ Φ+12Ψ
+
34,Φ
−
12Ψ
−
34,Ψ
+
12Φ
+
34,Ψ
−
12Φ
−
34
both Φ+12Ψ
−
34,Φ
−
12Ψ
+
34,Ψ
+
12Φ
−
34,Ψ
−
12Φ
+
34
TABLE III: Possible state preparations for given measure-
ment results for Scheme II. When Alice and Bob obtain the
measurement result as in the first column, there are four pos-
sible initial Bell state preparation (If the initial state were
prepared on a rotated basis, then it would correspond to one
of four Bell states after rotating it back, using the same local
unitary operation UR in (S6)) as shown in the second col-
umn. The symbols in the“Measurement results”column are
the same as in Table I.
perform measurements after they confirm the other re-
ceived the qubits.
Practical feasibility of the proposed schemes can be
sought in experiments that use Bell operator measure-
ments, such as teleportation [19] and entanglement swap-
ping [20]. Successful Bell type measurements have been
performed using two photons, which were both path- and
polarization entangled. Although there is an improve-
ment of the key bit generation rate compared to the pro-
tocol introduced by Zhao et. al. in [13], practical im-
plementation of the proposed scheme will have difficulty
with classical information needed to perform neccessary
local unitary operations before performing a Bell mea-
surement for each photon received.
The author thanks E. Knill for pointing out an error in
the previous version of the proposed protocol and mak-
ing many helpful comments. The author is also grateful
to R. Boisvert, G. Brennen, and R. Kuhn for helpful dis-
cussions.
[1] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[2] C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the
IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems
and Signal Processings, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New
York, 1984), p. 175.
[3] A.K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[4] C.H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
[5] L. Goldenberg and L. Vaidman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 75, 1239
(1995).
[6] D. Bruß, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018 (1998).
[7] H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. A
59, 4238 (1999).
[8] A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. A 61, 052312 (2000); Phys. Rev.
A 64, 024301 (2001).
[9] A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5635 (2000).
[10] G.L. Long and X.S. Liu, Phys. Rev. A 65, 032302 (2002).
[11] G.-P. Guo, C.-F. Li, B.-S. Shi, J. Li, and G.-C. Guo,
Phys. Rev. A 64, 042301 (2001).
[12] A. Beige, B.-G. Englert, Ch. Kurtseifer, and H. Wein-
furter, Acta. Phys. Pol. A 101, 357 (2002).
[13] Z. Zhao, T.Yang, Z.-B. Chen, J. Du, and J.-W. Pan,
quant-ph/0211098
[14] J.-W. Lee, E.K. Lee, Y.W. Chung, H.-W. Lee, and J.
Kim, Phys. Rev. A 68, 012324 (2003).
[15] J. Lee, S. Lee, J. Kim, and S.D. Oh, quant-ph/0309185.
[16] M. Zukowski, A. Zeilinger, M.A. Horne and A.K. Ekert,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 71, 4287 (1993).
[17] S. Bose, V. Vedral and P.L. Knight, Phys. Rev. A 57,
822 (1998).
[18] L. Hardy and D. Song, Phys. Rev. A 62, 052315 (2000).
[19] D. Boschi, S. Branca, F. De Martini, L. Hardy, and S.
Popescu, Phys. Rev. Lett. 80, 1121 (1998).
[20] J.-W. Pan, D. Bouwmeester, H. Weinfurter, and A.
Zeilinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 80, 3891 (1998).
4Alice Bob
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
FIG. 1: QKD using entanglement swapping. The bold line
means qubits are entangled and the dotted line implies a Bell
measurement is performed on the qubits. (i) Alice and Bob
each prepare arbitrary states, either in Bell or on a rotated
bases, known only to themselves. (ii) Each sends one qubit of
the states to the other party. (iii) After they confirm publicly
the other person received the qubit and announce the choice
of basis for initial preparation, Alice and Bob perform Bell
measurements on 1 and 4, and 2 and 3, respectively. (iv) Alice
and Bob now announce which Bell states had been prepared
(or their measurement result for Scheme II), and they are
able to find out the correlated measurement results (or initial
state preparation for Scheme II).
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FIG. 2: Eavesdropping scheme on the proposed entanglement
swapping QKD. As in Fig. 1, the bold line means the qubits
are entangled and the dotted line implies a Bell measurement
is performed on the qubits. (i) While Alice and Bob prepare
arbitrary states, Eve also prepares Φ+56. (ii) Eve intercepts
qubit 2 sent by Alice and sends qubit 6 to Bob instead. (iii)
Eve performs a Bell measurement on qubits 5 and 4. (iv) Eve
then performs a local operation on qubit 2 and sends it back
to Alice.
